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Abstract
This paper studies the design of optimal monetary policy (in terms of unconstrained Ramsey
allocation) in a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions. Furthermore I consider the
role of real wage rigidities. Optimal policy features signiﬁcant deviations from price stability
in response to various shocks. This is so since search externalities generate an unemploy-
ment/inﬂation trade-oﬀ. In response to productivity shocks optimal policy is pro-cyclical when
the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the share of unemployed people in the matching
technology and viceversa. This is so since when the workers’ share of surplus is high there are
many searching workers and few vacancies hence the monetary authority has an incentive to in-
crease vacancy proﬁtability by reducing the interest rate and increasing inﬂation. The opposite
is true when the workers’ share of surplus is high. This implies that optimal inﬂation volatility
is U-shaped with respect to workers’ bargaining power.
JEL Codes: E52, E24
Keywords: optimal monetary policy, matching frictions, wage rigidity.Non-Technical Summary
This paper derives optimal monetary policy in a model economy characterized by monopolistic
competition and adjustment costs on pricing and matching frictions in the labour market. Further-
more I will also consider the role of real wage rigidity. Several papers in the recent literature study
the eﬀects of introducing matching frictions in a New Keynesian framework but very little has been
done on the normative side. The assumption of monopolistic competition and adjustment cost on
pricing a’ la Rotemberg (1982) is needed to obtain non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy and to
make a meaningful comparison across diﬀerent monetary policy regimes. Introducing matching
frictions a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) in the labor market allows to consider frictional
unemployment in the steady state and provides a rich dynamics for the formation and dissolution
of employment relations. Finally the reason for considering the eﬀects on the optimal policy design
of real wage rigidity is twofold. First, several authors have argued that real wage rigidity helps
to recover the typical unemployment-inﬂation trade-oﬀ commonly faced by central banks. Such
trade-oﬀ, absent in standard new-keynesian models, is an essential feature to determine whether
optimal monetary policy should deviate from full price stabilization. Secondly, some authors have
shown that the introduction of real wage rigidity helps to resolve some inconsistencies between
the standard matching friction model and the empirical evidence. The design of optimal policy
in this paper follows the Ramsey approach according to which the monetary authority sets the
optimal path of all variables in the economy by maximizing agents’ welfare subject to the relations
describing the competitive economy.
The economy described is characterized by three sources of ineﬃciency, both in the long and
in the short run. The ﬁrst is monopolistic competition which induces an ineﬃciently low level of
output thereby calling for mild deviations from strict price stability1. The second type of distortion
stems form the cost of adjusting prices which reduces output resources thereby calling for closing the
“inﬂation gap”. Finally the search theoretic framework is characterized by a congestion externality
that tends to tighten the labour market. The chance that workers and ﬁrms have to match depends
on the number of unemployed people or vacant ﬁrms in the market. Whether there is excessive
vacancy creation or excessive unemployment depends on the bargaining power of workers: when
the latter (hence the workers’ share in the matching surplus) is too small there will be excessive
vacancy creation due to the high proﬁtability of a match for the ﬁrm and viceversa. In general
Hosios (1990) has shown that the distance between current and eﬃcient employment increases
when the distance between workers’ bargaining power and the fraction of searchers in the matching
technology increases.
Optimal policy features signiﬁcant deviations from price stability in response to various shocks.
This is so since search externalities generate an unemployment/inﬂation trade-oﬀ which induces the
monetary authority to strike a balance between reducing the cost of adjusting prices and increasing
an ineﬃciently low employment. In response to productivity shocks optimal policy is pro-cyclical
when the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the share of unemployed people in the matching
technology and viceversa. This is so since when the workers’ share of surplus is high (ﬁrms’ share
is low) there are many searching workers and few vacancies hence the monetary authority has an
incentive to increase vacancy proﬁtability by reducing the interest rate and increasing inﬂation.
T h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ew h e nt h ew o r k e r s ’s h a r eo fs urplus is high. This also implies that optimal
1See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Faia (2005) among others.
inﬂation volatility is U-shaped with respect to workers’ bargaining power.
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Most central banks face an inﬂation-unemployment trade-oﬀ which implies that price stabilization
can be achieved at the cost of higher unemployment. Moreover the ratio between the cost of
inﬂation and the cost of unemployment is typically an increasing function of the degree of labor
market rigidity. The trade-oﬀs described suggest that the optimal monetary policy design should
strike a balance between stabilizing inﬂation and ﬁghting low employment. However most of the
recent literature on the design of monetary policy concludes that optimality features either zero
inﬂation or small deviations from price stability. This result has been established under diﬀerent
settings and characterizes both the closed and the open economy context1. One shortcoming of
those studies is the lack of labor market rigidities which are a key ingredient in generating steady
state unemployment and in characterizing employment ﬂuctuations.
This paper derives optimal monetary policy in a model economy characterized by monopolistic
competition and adjustment costs on pricing and matching frictions in the labour market. Further-
more I will also consider the role of real wage rigidity. Several papers in the recent literature study
the eﬀects of introducing matching frictions in a New Keynesian framework but very little has been
done on the normative side. The assumption of monopolistic competition and adjustment cost on
pricing a’ la Rotemberg (1982) is needed to obtain non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy and to
make a meaningful comparison across diﬀerent monetary policy regimes. Introducing matching
frictions a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) in the labor market allows to consider frictional
unemployment in the steady state and provides a rich dynamics for the formation and dissolution
of employment relations2. Finally the reason for considering the eﬀects on the optimal policy design
of real wage rigidity is twofold. First, several authors have argued that real wage rigidity helps
to recover the typical unemployment-inﬂation trade-oﬀ commonly faced by central banks3. Such
trade-oﬀ, absent in standard new-keynesian models, is an essential feature to determine whether
optimal monetary policy should deviate from full price stabilization. Secondly, some authors have
1Zero inﬂation is the core result in the analysis of Woodford (2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) who consider
a monopolistic competitive framework with sticky prices a’ la Calvo (1983). Lately Khan, King and Wolman (2003)
and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) have shown, using the Ramsey approach, that in presence of sticky prices and
money distortions optimal policy implies small deviations from price stability and departure from the Friedman rule.
The same is true in presence of capital accumulation, see Faia (2005). Finally Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) have
shown by using a model with prices set one period in advance, that zero inﬂation is the optimal policy under a certain
class of preferences.
2The introduction of matching frictions into a new Keynesian model has become common in the recent literature
since it allows to replicate some empirical features. The laboratory economy that I use is very close to the one
proposed in Krause and Lubik (2005). Several other authors, ranging from Walsh (2003) to Blanchard and Gali’
(2005a,b), have recently introduced matching frictions and real wage rigidity into new Keynesian models.
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the standard matching friction model and the empirical evidence4. The design of optimal policy
in this paper follows the Ramsey approach according to which the monetary authority sets the
optimal path of all variables in the economy by maximizing agents’ welfare subject to the relations
describing the competitive economy.
The economy described is characterized by three sources of ineﬃciency, both in the long and
in the short run. The ﬁrst is monopolistic competition which induces an ineﬃciently low level of
output thereby calling for mild deviations from strict price stability5. The second type of distortion
stems form the cost of adjusting prices which reduces output resources thereby calling for closing the
“inﬂation gap”. Finally the search theoretic framework is characterized by a congestion externality
that tends to tighten the labour market. The chance that workers and ﬁrms have to match depends
on the number of unemployed people or vacant ﬁrms in the market. Whether there is excessive
vacancy creation or excessive unemployment depends on the bargaining power of workers: when
the latter (hence the workers’ share in the matching surplus) is too small there will be excessive
vacancy creation due to the high proﬁtability of a match for the ﬁrm and viceversa. In general
Hosios (1990) has shown that the distance between current and eﬃcient employment increases
when the distance between workers’ bargaining power and the fraction of searchers in the matching
technology increases.
I ﬁnd that the in general optimal policy should deviate from price stability in response to
diﬀerent types of shocks. Contrary to previous studies deviations from the ﬂexible price allocation
are quantitatively signiﬁcant. This is so search externalities generate an unemployment/inﬂation
trade-oﬀ which induces the monetary authority to strike a balance between reducing the cost of
adjusting prices and increasing an ineﬃciently low employment.
In response to productivity shocks optimal policy is pro-cyclical when the worker’s bargaining
power is higher than the share of unemployed people in the matching technology and countercyclical
in the opposite case. The reason for this is as follows. When the workers’ share of surplus is high
and ﬁrms’ share is low there are many searching workers and few vacancies. In this case the
monetary authority has an incentive to increase vacancy proﬁtability by reducing the interest rate
and increasing demand. This obviously comes at the cost of higher inﬂation. The opposite is true
when the workers’ share of surplus is high. In general I ﬁnd that the optimal inﬂation volatility is
U-shaped with respect to workers’ bargaining power and for given share of unemployed workers in
the matching technology. In other words the monetary authority has an incentive to intervene and
4See Hall (2003), Shimer (2003) and Krause and Lubik (2005).
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Faia (2005) among others.
7
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 707
January 2007reduce the search externality by manipulating inﬂation only when the distance between current
and eﬃcient employment increases (e.g. when the distance between workers’ bargaining power and
the fraction of searchers in the matching technology increases).
The comparison between the dynamic under the Ramsey policy and the ones under other type
of operational rules shows that the ﬁrst induces higher variability of all variables. Under the types
of rules considered, Taylor rule and the unemployment targeting, the monetary authority is only
concerned with stabilization. On the contrary the Ramsey planner has the incentive to take full
advantage of the productivity increase thereby exploiting all the beneﬁts of the expansionary phase.
The ﬁndings in this paper are consistent with those in Cooley and Quadrini (2004). They study
Ramsey monetary policy, both under commitment and discretion, in an economy with matching
frictions and limited participation in ﬁnancial market. Despite the fact that they have a diﬀerent
transmission mechanism they also reach the conclusion that the optimal policy should be pro-
cyclical in response to productivity shocks when the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the
share of unemployed people in the matching technology.
Blanchard and Gali’ (2005) build a closed economy model with matching frictions and wage
rigidity and conduct some normative analysis. They ﬁnd that the output/inﬂation trade-oﬀ induces
the monetary authority to deviate from strict inﬂation targeting. However their optimal policy
analysis is based on a microfounded loss function and a loglinear approximation of the competitive
equilibrium relations around a steady state where all distortions have been eliminated through an
appropriate choice of the parameter space. This implies that the emergence of the output/inﬂation
trade-oﬀ in their case is not directly related to the search externality, rather to the presence of
sticky wages as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal
policy plan. Section 4 shows results for the long run optimal policy. Section 5 shows results for the
optimal policy along the dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
There is a continuum of agents whose total measure is normalized to one. The economy is popu-
lated by households who consume diﬀerent varieties of goods, save and work. Households save in
both non-state contingent securities and in an insurance fund that allows them to smooth income
ﬂuctuations associated with periods of unemployment. Each agent can indeed be either employed
or unemployed. In the ﬁrst case he receives a wage that is determined according to a Nash bargain-
ing, in the second case he receives an unemployment beneﬁt. The labor market is characterized
8
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competitive sector which produces a diﬀerentiated good using labor as input and faces adjustment









 −1 be a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of diﬀerent varieties of goods. The op-
























where c denotes aggregate consumption in ﬁnal goods. Households supply labor hours inelastically
h (which is normalized to 1). Total real labor income is given by wt and is speciﬁed below.
Unemployed households members, ut, receive an unemployment beneﬁt, b. The contract signed
between the worker and the ﬁrm speciﬁes the wage and is obtained through a Nash bargaining
process. In order to ﬁnance consumption at time t each agent also invests in non-state contingent
nominal bonds bt which pay a gross nominal interest rate (1+rn
t ) one period later. As in Andolfatto
(1996) and Merz (1995) it is assumed that workers can insure themselves against earning uncertainty
and unemployment. For this reason the wage earnings have to be interpreted as net of insurance
costs. Finally agents receive proﬁts from the monopolistic sector which they own, Θt, and pay















Households choose the set of processes {ct,b t}∞
t=0 taking as given the set of processes {pt,w t,r n
t }∞
t=0















t = {s0,....st} denote the history of events up to date t,w h e r est denotes the event realization at date t.
The date 0 probability of observing history s
t is given by ρt. The initial state s
0 is given so that ρ0 =1 . Henceforth,




t) as the mathematical
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respect to bonds. Optimality requires that No-Ponzi condition on wealth is also satisﬁed.
2.2 The Production Sector
Firms in the production sector sell their output in a monopolistic competitive market and meet
workers on a matching market. The labor relations are determined according to a standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) framework. Workers must be hired from the unemployment pool
and searching for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost. Workers wages are determined through a Nash
decentralized bargaining process which takes place on an individual basis.
2.2.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
The search for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost κ and the probability of ﬁnding a worker depends on a
constant return to scale matching technology which converts unemployed workers u and vacancies








0 vi,tdi. Deﬁning labor market tightness as θt ≡ vt
ut,t h eﬁrm meets unemployed




t , while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate
θtq(θt)=mθ
1−ξ
t . If the search process is successful, the ﬁrm in the monopolistic good sector
operates the following technology:
yi,t = ztni,t (6)
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock which follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive process,
ezt = eρzzt−1εz,t, and ni,t is the number of workers hired by each ﬁrm. Matches are destroyed at
an exogenous rate ρ7. We are now in the position to determine the law of motion for the workers
employed and the ones seeking for a job. Labor force is normalized to unity. The number of
employed people at time t in each ﬁrm i is given by the number of employed people at time t − 1
plus the ﬂow of new matches concluded in period t − 1 who did not discontinue the match:
ni,t =( 1− ρ)(ni,t−1 + vi,t−1q(θi,t−1)) (7)
7The alternative assumption of endogenous job destruction would induce, consistently with empirical observations,
additional persistence to the model as shown in denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (2000). However due to the normative
focus of this paper I choose the more simple assumption of exogenous job destruction. This greatly reduces the
complexity of the numerical solution to the optimal policy problem without altering the results compared to the
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ut =1− nt (8)






Firms in the monopolistic sector use labor to produce diﬀerent varieties of consumption good and
face a quadratic cost of adjusting prices. Wages are determined through the bargaining problem
analyzed in the next section. Here I develop the dynamic optimization decision of ﬁrms choosing
prices, pi
h,t, number of employees, ni,t, number of vacancies, vi,t, to maximize the discounted value of






































yt = ztni,t (11)












t represent the cost of adjusting prices, ψ can be thought as the sluggishness
in the price adjustment process, κ as the cost of posting vacancies and wt denotes the fact that the
bargained wage might depend on time varying factors. Let’s deﬁne mct, the lagrange multiplier
on constraint (11), as the marginal cost of ﬁrms and µt, the lagrange multiplier on constraint (12),
as the marginal value of one worker. Since all ﬁrms will chose in equilibrium the same price and
allocation we can now assume symmetry and drop the index i. First order conditions for the above
problem read as follows:
• nt :
µt = mctzt − wt + βEt(
λt+1
λt







)((1 − ρ)µt+1) (14)
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As already noticed in Krause and Lubik (2005) in a matching model the marginal cost of ﬁrms
is not only given by the marginal productivity of each single employee, wt
zt , as it is in a standard
walrasian model but contains an extra component,
µt− κ
q(θt)
zt ,which depends on the future value of
each employee. Posting vacancy is costly hence a successful match today is valuable also since it
reduces future search costs.
2.2.3 Bellman Equations, Wage Setting and Nash Bargaining
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution to an individual Nash bargaining process. To
solve for it we need ﬁrst to derive the marginal values of a match for both, ﬁrms and workers.
Those values will indeed enter the sharing rule of the bargaining process. Let’s denote by V J
t the
marginal discounted value of a match for a ﬁrm:
V J
t = mctzt − wt + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (17)
The marginal value of a match depends on real revenues minus the real wage plus the dis-
counted continuation value. With probability (1−ρ) the job remains ﬁlled and earns the expected
value and with probability, ρ, the job is destroyed and has zero value. Using the equation (16) we








)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (18)
Since the net value of a match for the ﬁrm must be zero in equilibrium the following zero proﬁt






)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (19)
Equation (19) is an arbitrage condition for the posting of new vacancies. It implies that in
equilibrium the cost of posting a vacancy must equate the discounted expected return from posting





t =[ wt + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[(1 − ρ)V E
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t =[ b + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[θtq(θt)(1 − ρ)V E
t+1 +( 1− θtq(θt)(1 − ρ))V U
t+1]} (21)
where b denotes real unemployment beneﬁts.
Workers and ﬁrms are engaged in a Nash bargaining process to determine wages. The optimal
sharing rule of the standard Nash bargaining is given:
(V E






After substituting the previously deﬁned value functions it is possible derive the following wage
schedule:
wt = ς(mctzt + θtκ)+( 1− ς)b (23)
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
Aggregate output is obtained by aggregating production of individual ﬁrms. I assume that there
is exogenous government expenditure ﬁnanced through lump sum taxation. Hence the resource
constraint reads as follows:






Furthermore I assume zero total net supply of bonds.
Deﬁnition 1. A distorted competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of allocation
and prices {ct,u t,n t,v t,θt,πt,y t,w t,rn
t ,mc t}∞
t=0 which, for given initial B0 satisﬁes equations
(4),(7),(8),(13),(14),(15),(23),
(24) and θt ≡ vt
ut.
3 The Optimal Policy Problem
The optimal policy is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the discounted sum of
utilities of all agents given the constraints of the competitive economy. The next task is to select
the relations that represent the relevant constraints in the planner’s optimal policy problem. This
amounts to describing the competitive equilibrium in terms of a minimal set of relations involving
only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach described in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
There is a fundamental diﬀerence, though, between that classic approach and the one followed
here, which stems from the impossibility, in the presence of sticky prices and matching frictions,
of reducing the planner’s problem to a maximization only subject to a single implementability
constraint8.
8See also Khan, King and Wolman (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) and Faia (2005).
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c−σ









The ﬁrst order conditions and the constraints of the production sector can be summarized as
follows:




















where θt ≡ vt
utand ut =1−nt. Finally need to include the resource constraint and the employment
dynamic:










3.1 The Role of Frictions in This Economy
As discussed previously this economy is characterized by three main frictions: price stickiness,
monopolistic competition and matching frictions in the labor market. A monetary policy maker
endowed with a single instrument is not able eliminate all the three distortions but can only trade-
oﬀ among them. To better understand the type of trade-oﬀs present in this model economy it is
useful to discuss the role of each friction singularly and the level of the policy instrument required
to oﬀset them.
I start by analyzing the role of matching frictions in the labor market since they provide the
novel aspect for the design of the optimal policy in the context of new keynesian models. To
understand how search externality distort the competitive equilibrium let’s assume for simplicity
that those are the only frictions characterizing the model economy and let’s derive the conditions
for constrained pareto eﬃciency. The optimal policy problem of the planner in this context (and











ztnt − κvt = ct (31)
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where θt ≡ vt
ut, ut =1− nt and q(θ)=mθ
−ξ
t . Let’s deﬁne as ψ1,t and ψ2,t respectively the




t − ψ1,t =0 (33)
• nt :
ψ1,tzt − ψ2,t+1(1 − ρ)mv
1−ξ
t+1ξ(1 − nt+1)ξ−1 + ψ2,t+1 =0 (34)
• vt :
−ψ1,tκ − ψ2,tm(1 − nt)ξ−1(1 − ρ)(1 − ξ)v
−ξ
t =0 (35)














Notice that equation (36) is equivalent to (27) when ξ = ς. This is exactly the condition
that Hosios (1990) suggests to achieve constrained pareto eﬃciency in an economy with matching
frictions. Eﬃciency requires workers’ bargaining power being equivalent to their share in the
matching technology. When workers bargaining power is too low (ξ ≤ ς) ﬁrms ﬁnd too proﬁtable
to form a match thereby inducing excessive vacancy creation. Viceversa, when workers’ bargaining
power is too high there is excessive unemployment. If the condition for eﬃciency are not met an
obvious solution is to endow the policy maker with a complementary subsidy that forces ξ = ς. As
we shall see below in absence of such subsidy the monetary authority can use inﬂation to control
for the optimal level of unemployment in the economy.
Let’s now consider the role of price stickiness and monopolistic competition. Price stickiness
induces a gap with the ﬂexible price allocation since part of resources are wasted in the activity of
adjusting prices, (πt − 1)
2 . Finally monopolistic competition reduces the level of economic activity
by decreasing optimal demand, hence the marginal cost to ﬁr m s( s e ea l s oS c h m i t t - G r o h ea n dU r i b e
(2004)).
We are now in the position to determine the level of the policy instrument which can oﬀset
each distortion at the time. Obviously the cost of adjusting prices can be eliminated by setting
πt =1at all times, thereby following a strict price stability policy. From the Phillips curve it
is obvious that an increase in the marginal cost (hence a reduction of mark-up and an increase
15
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competition can be directly aﬀected by the inﬂation level. As for the matching frictions the policy
maker can have only an indirect impact on those externalities by using inﬂation. Consider the
marginal discounted value of a match for a ﬁrm:
V J
t = mctzt − wt + Et{(β
λt+1
λt
)[(1 − ρ)V J
t+1]} (37)








(1 − ρ)Πt+j} (38)
where Πt+j = mct+jzt+j − wt+j. Since the discounted value of a match must equate the cost









(1 − ρ)Πt+j} (39)
A reduction in the mark-up (or an increase in demand and marginal costs) achieved through
an increase in inﬂation can increase unitary proﬁts, Πt+j = mct+jzt+j − wt+j,at each point in
time. An increase in unitary proﬁts, for given cost of posting vacancy κ, can reduce labor market
tightness, q(θt),thereby reducing the congestion externality. Positive inﬂation can therefore have
an indirect impact on the probability of forming matches through its impact on the demand for
varieties.
To summarize we have on the one side two distortions, monopolistic competition and search
externality, that call for positive inﬂation while we have on the other side a third distortion, price
stickiness, which calls for zero net inﬂation. Since the policy maker should trade-oﬀ among those
three distortions we expect the optimal policy to deviate from strict price stability.
3.2 The Optimal Policy Problem Under Commitment
I now turn to the speciﬁcation of a general set-up for the optimal policy conduct.
Deﬁnition 2.L e t{λ1,t,λ 2,t,λ 3,t,λ 4,t,λ 5,t}
∞
t=0 represent sequences of Lagrange multipliers on
the constraints (25), (26), (27), (28) and (29) respectively. Then for given stochastic processes
{zt,g t}∞
t=0 and for given B0 plans for the control variables {ct,n t,v t,πt,rn
t ,mc t}∞
t=0 and for the
co-state variables {λ1,t,λ 2,t,λ 3,t,λ 4,t,λ 5,t}
∞
t=0 represent a ﬁrst best constrained allocation if they
solve the following maximization problem:
Choose Λn
t ≡ {λ1,t,λ 2,t,λ 3,t,λ 4,t,λ 5,t}
∞
t=0 and Ξn






























































where θt ≡ vt
utand ut =1− nt
3.2.1 Non-recursivity and Initial Conditions
As a result of the constraint (25), (26) and (27) exhibiting future expectations of control variables,
the maximization problem as spelled out in (40) is intrinsically non-recursive.9 As ﬁrst emphasized
in Kydland and Prescott (1980), and then developed by Marcet and Marimon (1999), a formal way
to rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the planner’s state space
with additional (pseudo) co-state variables. Such variables, that I denote χ1,t,χ 2,t and χ3,tfor (25),
(26) and (27) respectively, bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the
planner of committing to the pre-announced policy plan. Another aspect concerns the speciﬁcation
of the law of motion of these lagrange multipliers. For in this case both constraints feature a simple
one period expectation, the same co-state variables have to obey the laws of motion10:
χ1,t+1 = λ1,t (41)
χ2,t+1 = λ2,t
χ3,t+1 = λ3,t
9See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978). As such the system does not satisfy per se the principle of
optimality, according to which the optimal decision at time t is a time invariant function only of a small set of state
variables.
10The laws of motion of the additional costate variables would take a more general form if the expectations horizon
in the forward looking constraint(s) featured a more complicated structure, as, for instance, in the case of constraints
in present value form. See Marcet and Marimon (1999).
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space {zt,g t,χ 1,t,χ 2,t ,χ 3,t}. To avoid time consistency problems and consistently with a timeless
perspective I set the values of the three co-state variables at time zero equal to their solution in the
steady state. I will return on this point in the next subsection.
3.3 Calibration
Preferences. Time is measured in quarters. I set the discount factor β =0 .99, so that the annual
interest rate is equal to 4 percent. The parameter on consumption in the utility function is set
equal to 2.
Production. Following Basu and Fernald (1997) I set the value added mark-up of prices over
marginal cost to 0.2. This generates a value for the price elasticity of demand, ε, of 6. Is e tt h ec o s t
of adjusting prices ψ =5 0so as to generate a slope of the log-linear Phillips curve consistent with
empirical and theoretical studies.
Labor market frictions parameters. The matching technology is homogenous of degree
one function and is characterized by the parameter ξ. Consistently with estimates by Blanchard
and Diamond (1989) I set this parameter to 0.4. I set the steady state ﬁrm matching rate, q(θ), to
0.7 which is the value used by denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (1997). The probability for a worker
of ﬁnding a job, θq(θ), is set equal to 0.6, which implies an average duration of unemployment
of 1.67 as reported ion Cole and Rogerson (1996). With those values it is possible to determine
the number of vacancies as well as the vacancy/unemployment ratio. The exogenous separation
probability, ρ,i ss e tt o0.08 consistently with estimates from Hall (1995) and Davis et al. (1996);
this value is also compatible with those used in the literature which range from 0.7 (Merz (1995)) to
0.15 (Andolfatto (1996)). The degree of wage rigidity, λ, is set equal to 0.6 and is compatible with
estimates from Smets and Wouters (2003). The value for b is set so as to generate a steady state
ratio, b
w, of 0.5 which corresponds to the average value observed for industrialized countries (see
Nickell and Nunziata (2001)). The steady state scale paramter, m, is obtained using the observation
that steady state number of matches is given by
ρ
1−ρ(1−u). The bargaining power of workers, ς,is
set to 0.5 as in most papers in the literature, while the value for the cost of posting vacancies is
obtained from the steady state version of labour market tightness evolution.
Exogenous shocks and monetary policy: The process for the aggregate productivity
shock, zt, follows an AR(1) and based on the RBC literature is calibrated so that its standard
deviations is set to 0.008 and its persistence to 0.95. Log-government consumption evolves according












t, where the steady-state share of
government consumption, g, is set so that
g
y =0 .25 and ε
g
t is an i.i.d. shock with standard
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4 Steady State Optimal Policy
Before turning to the optimal stabilization policy in response to shocks we need to characterize
the log-run optimal policy, which is the one to which the policy maker would like to converge.
To develop an analogy with the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, this amounts to computing the
modiﬁed golden rule steady state. To determine the long-run inﬂation rate associated to the optimal
policy problem above, one needs to solve the steady-state version of the set of eﬃciency conditions.
Notice in particular that the ﬁrst order condition with respect to inﬂation reads as follows:
(λ2,t − χ2,t)c−σ
t ψ(2πt − 1)yt − λ4,tψ(πt − 1)yt =0 (42)
For the whole set of optimality conditions of the Ramsey plan to be satisﬁed in the steady state a
necessary condition is that equation (42) is satisﬁed in the steady state. In that steady-state, we
have λ2,t = λ2,t−1 = χ2,t. Hence condition (42) immediately implies:
λ4ψ (π − 1)y =0 (43)
Since λ4 > 0 (the resource constraint must hold with equality), y>0 and ψ>0 (we are not
imposing ap r i o r ithat the steady-state coincides with the ﬂexible price allocation), in turn (43) must
imply π =1 . Hence the Ramsey planner would like to generate an average (net) inﬂation rate of
zero. The intuition for why the long-run optimal inﬂation rate is zero is simple. Under commitment,
the planner cannot resort to ex-post inﬂation as a device for eliminating the ineﬃciency related to
market power in the goods market. Hence the planner aims at choosing that rate of inﬂation that
allows to minimize the cost of adjusting prices, and summarized by the quadratic term ϑ
2 (πt − 1)
2.
One may wonder why the search externality does not apparently exert any inﬂuence on the
desired optimal long-run inﬂation rate. In light of our considerations above, the desire of reducing
the congestion externality by increasing ﬁrms proﬁts has been shown to be a suﬃcient motive for
inducing the planner to deviate from choosing a constant markup allocation. However, since the
policy maker can exert only an indirect eﬀect on the search externality via a reduction in mark-up
and since it cannot resort to ex-post inﬂation as a device for eliminating the ineﬃciency related to
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Since we are mostly interested in the analysis of optimal policy along the business cycle we can
now analyze the optimal dynamic of variables in response to shocks. We focus on productivity and
government expenditure shocks. To solve for the optimal stabilization policy I compute second order
approximations11 of the ﬁrst order conditions of the Lagrangian problem described in deﬁnition 2.
Technically I compute the stationary allocations that characterize the deterministic steady state
of the ﬁrst order conditions to the Ramsey plan. I then compute a second order approximation
of the respective policy functions in the neighborhood of the same steady state. This amounts to
implicitly assuming that the economy has been evolving and policy has been conducted around
such a steady already for a long period of time (under timeless perspective).
Before proceeding with the quantitative analysis of the optimal policy it is worth noticing
that the competitive economy of the present model generates a volatility of unemployment which
is higher than the one featured by a standard new keynesian model and that the Beveridge curve
holds. Overall the model is able to account fairly well for the main stylized facts characterizing the
labor market12.
5.1 Dynamic of the Optimal Policy in Response to Shocks
Figure (1) shows impulse response of selected variables to productivity shocks. An increase in
productivity induces an increase in output. Optimal policy also features an increase in inﬂation (and
prices) to allow the economy to take full advantage of the higher productivity. Indeed a reduction
in the mark-up (or an increase in demand and marginal costs) achieved through an increase in
inﬂation can increase unitary proﬁts, Πt+j = mct+jzt+j − wt+j,at each point in time. An increase
in unitary proﬁts, for given cost of posting vacancy κ, increases vacancy posting and reduces labor
market tightness, q(θt),thereby squeezing the congestion externality. As a consequence there is an
increase in employment as well. Positive inﬂation can therefore have an indirect positive impact
on the probability of forming matches through its impact on the demand for varieties. This is
beneﬁcial on consumption and employment as well.
Figure (2) shows the response of the same set of variables to government expenditure shocks.
Optimal monetary policy implies in this case a fall in consumption and in the price level. The
government will want to have less consumption when government purchases are high since this
11Second order approximation methods have the particular advantage of accounting for the eﬀects of volatility of
variables on the mean levels of the same. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b) among others.
12In this context it is important to stress that the qualitative results concerning optimal policy (mostly the devia-
tions from price stability) remain the same independently from the calibration of the labor market parameters.
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monopoly producers. This argument is valid when the utility of the representative agent is separable
so that the price of the state contingent security only depends on consumption13.I n o r d e r t o
generate a fall in consumption the government increases the nominal interest rate and this also
implies a fall in the price level.
Importantly deviations from price stability are signiﬁcant in response to both shocks. This
is in sharp contrast with the conclusions reached by previous studies of optimal policy which had
shown that deviations from price stability were nil or negligible mostly in response to productivity
shocks. In general it had been established that, in a context with monopolistic competition and
sticky prices, the constrained pareto optimum is reached by replicating the ﬂexible price allocation
and that monetary policy should be neutral in response to productivity shocks. On the contrary
in our context optimal policy is in pro-cyclical in response to productivity shocks. With search
frictions indeed the level of employment is ineﬃciently low and a trade-oﬀ exists between inﬂation
and employment/output stabilization. In presence of such trade-oﬀ the monetary authority should
strike a balance between reducing the cost of adjusting prices and increasing employment.
A crucial determinant of the size and the direction of the congestion externality is the dis-
tance between the worker’s bargaining power and the share of unemployed people in the matching
technology. As mentioned before, Hosios (1990) had shown that eﬃciency can be achieved in a
matching model when workers’ bargaining power is equal to the share of unemployed people in
the matching technology. In diﬀerent cases the labor market is tight, the probability of forming a
m a t c hi sl o wa n de m p l o y m e n ti si n e ﬃciently low. In general whenever the labor market features an
ineﬃciency the monetary authority has an incentive to intervene and deviate from price stability.
However when the bargaining power is high (for given share of unemployed people in the matching
technology), workers’ share of surplus is high (and ﬁrms’ share is low) and vacancies have little
proﬁtability. In this case there is an excess of searching workers compared to the number of vacan-
cies. This increases labor market tightness and unemployment. Under those circumstances optimal
policy should be pro-cyclical since an increase in inﬂation, achieved through a reduction of the
nominal interest rate, increases demand and unitary ﬁrms’ proﬁts which in turn increase vacancy
proﬁtability and employment. On the contrary when workers’ bargaining power is low (ﬁrms’ share
of surplus is high) there is an excessive vacancy creation hence the monetary authority should be
countercyclical.
Figure (3) shows the dynamic of the Ramsey allocation in response to productivity shocks and
for diﬀerent values of the bargaining power (0.2 vs. 0.6) and for given share of unemployed people
13See Khan, King and Wolman (2000).
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In this case there is excessive vacancy creation hence a reduction in inﬂation by increasing the
mark-up reduces demand and vacancy proﬁtability. The contrary is true for ς =0 .6. In both cases
however the result is an increase in consumption, output and employment due to the reduction in
the search externality.
5.2 Comparison Between Ramsey Policy and Policy Rules
Some interesting observations come from the comparison between the dynamic under the Ramsey
policy and the dynamic generated by some simple operational policy rules. Figure (4) shows the
dynamic of selected variables in response to productivity shocks and under three diﬀerent regime.



















with φπ =1 .5 and φy =0 .5.The second regime is represented by a rule that targets unemploy-


















with φπ =3and φu =0 .3. ﬁnally the third regime is given by the Ramsey policy.
Figure (4) shows the dynamic of selected variables in response to productivity shocks and
under the three regimes described. It stands clear that the Ramsey policy implies a much higher
volatility compared to the other two rules. This is so since under both rules, the Taylor rule and the
unemployment targeting, the monetary authority is only concerned with stabilization and for this
reason behaves countercyclically (inﬂation goes down in response to productivity shocks). On the
contrary the Ramsey planner has the incentive to take full advantage of the productivity increase
thereby exploiting all the beneﬁts of the expansionary phase.
5.3 Optimal Volatility of Inﬂation
To fully analyze the properties of the optimal policy along the cycle we are obliged to study the path
of the optimal inﬂation volatility for diﬀerent values of the bargaining power. Once again the level
of the bargaining power is an indicator of the size and the direction of the congestion externality.
As before we expect the optimal policy to be pro-cyclical when the number of searching workers
is too high compared to the number of vacancies (e.g. when workers’ bargaining power is higher
than the share of unemployed people in the matching technology) and viceversa. However in any
case inﬂation volatility is increasing whenever the bargaining power gets distant from the number
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to intervene and reduce the search externality are higher when the distance between the current
employment and the eﬃcient one increase (e.g. when the distance between workers’ bargaining
power and share of unemployed workers in the matching technology increases independently from
the direction). This is conﬁrmed by ﬁgure (5) which shows that the optimal inﬂation volatility is
indeed U-shaped with respect to ς for given value of ξ =0 .4.
5.4 Adding Real Wage Rigidity
Shimer (2003), Hall (2003) noticed that in a matching model a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides wages
are too volatile since little adjustment takes place along the employment margin. They also noticed
that the introduction of real wage rigidity helps to resolve some of the puzzling features of the
standard matching model. Thereby following Hall (2003) I assume that the individual real wage is
a weighted average of the one obtained through the Nash bargaining process and the one obtained
as solution to the steady state14:
wt = λ[ς(mctzt + θtκ)+( 1− ς)b]+( 1− λ)w (46)
Adding real wage rigidity does not alter any of the previous results15 since it does not change
the main policy trade-oﬀs. Optimal monetary is still characterized by signiﬁcant deviations from
price stability and the optimal volatility of inﬂation is still a U-shaped function of the bargaining
power. The only noticeable diﬀerence is that the introduction of real wage rigidity increases the
volatility of all variables under the Ramsey policy. Intuitively real wage rigidity tends to exacerbate
the inﬂation/unemployment trade-oﬀ thereby calling for stronger intervention on the side of the
monetary authority. The latter result seems consistent with Blanchard and Gali’ (2005).
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper derives optimal monetary policy in a model with monopolistic competition and sticky
prices, matching frictions and real wage rigidity in the labour market. In response to both produc-
tivity and government expenditure shocks optimal policy features signiﬁcant deviations from price
stability. This is so since search externalities generate an unemployment/inﬂation trade-oﬀ which
induces the monetary authority to strike a balance between reducing the cost of adjusting prices
and increasing an ineﬃciently low employment.
14Notice that the results in this paper remain valid when the wage is set as a weighted average of current and past
values.
15Results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
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power is higher than the share of unemployed people in the matching technology and viceversa.
This is so since when the workers’ share of surplus is high (ﬁrms’ share is low) there is an excessive
number of searching workers and few vacancies. In this case the monetary authority has an incentive
to increase vacancy creation by increasing their proﬁtability. It does that by reducing the interest
rate, therefore increasing demand and inﬂation. The opposite is true when the workers’ share of
surplus is low: in this case the congestion externality is generated by an excessive vacancy creation
that the monetary authority tries to discourage.
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Let Λn
t ≡ {λ1,t,λ 2,t,λ 3,t,λ 4,t,λ 5,t}
∞
t=0 and Ξn
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utand ut =1− nt.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses under Ramsey allocation to productivity shocks.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses under Ramsey allocation to government expenditure shocks.
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